The Limiting Mechanism In Subject Naturalism
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What is it?
An attempt to clearly work through the means by which science would limit philosophy as proposed in Price’s “subject naturalism.”
Concerns include: - Is it possible to give such an account independently of a more general meta-philosophical or meta-metaphysical framework? - Does the view just amount to an uncontroversial acceptance of scientific results? - Does the limiting mechanism itself involve some sort of representationalist move?
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An example of limiting
Price gives a good example of one way in which subject naturalist may limit our philosophy in his discussion of McDowell’s Mind and World (see Price Mind And World ). There he argues that science has made us aware of the contingent may in which our perceptual apparatus contribute to what we experience as the world. This means that one may not postulate a philosophical theory (as he holds Mc Dowell does) that stipulates we are in direct contact with the external world.
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