Fichte And Davidson
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- Is there a relationship between Fichte and Davidson in terms of the need for the existence of other rational beings in order to have consciousness?
[[blue Tom says ~ This is tantalising! Given how difficult it might be to bring up, coldblooded, as it were, in tute, would you care to elaborate here a bit more? My understanding of Fichte was that he is a subjective idealist: the absolute subject is its own self-positing, and it must posit its other in order to generate an consciousness of objects. How do other people fit into this system? And how are you thinking of Davidson in relation to Fichte?! ]]
{[green Okay here’s a brief run-down on what I understand Fichte’s position to be: ]} - {[green Our (indefeasible) transcendental starting point is the I positing itself. ]} — {[green The acceptance of this starting point is reliant upon one’s acceptance of the categorical imperative, i.e. the recognition of oneself as a free moral agent. ]} — {[green Thus freedom becomes an essential part of Fichte’s system ]} - {[green Next, given our transcendental starting point we look for its necessary conditions. ]} — {[green It is in this context that the necessity of others is posited. ]} - {[green From the above we need to be able to deal with a concept of freedom. However, Fichte holds that the only kind of actual freedom that can exist is limited or finite freedom. ]} — {[green So now we are in situation in which a necessary condition for the existence of the self-positing I is some sort of limit on its freedom. ]} - {[green Next, Fichte notes that one can only be conscious of oneself as an individual and takes this to require that one also be aware of a realm of rational beings of which one is a member. (And a necessary condition for this is a world of objects.) ]} - {[green Finally then, it is the “summons” from what we take to be other free beings like us that provide us with the necessary limit on our freedom. ]}
{[green Okay, so that’s Fichte sorted (maybe). Next I guess we need to look a little more at Davidson’s idea of the necessity of an interpreter for consciousness (I might take a stab at this next week) and then see if any aspects of the two views match up. ]}
{[green Perhaps Fichte’s central use of freedom and the desire for freedom of spontaneity in the sort of project Davidson is engaged in might be good early bridging candidates? ]}
{[green Chris ]}
{[green Okay, a belated return to this after reading something that may be of relevance in the Stanford article on concepts (worth a look on its own merits really). The following is a quote from Davidson used in the article: ]}
{[green We have the idea of belief only from the role of belief in the interpretation of language, for as a private attitude it is not intelligible except as an adjustment to the public norm provided by language. It follows that a creature must be a member of a speech community if it is to have the concept of belief. And given the dependence of other attitudes on belief, we can say more generally that only a creature that can interpret speech can have a concept of thought. ]}
{[green Somehow Davidson links having the concept of belief with actually be able to have beliefs (and other concepts). However, as the authors of the article point out, “why the concept of a belief is needed to have other concepts is somewhat obscure in Davidson’s writings.” ]}
{[green Based on the quote above, perhaps Davidson’s argument that other people are necessary for consciousness has its roots in Wittgenstein’s private language argument: language is needed in order for us to have concepts and a community is needed in order to have language. As indicated above however, the first step along this path seems quite shaky. ]}
{[green Chris ]}
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