Glymour Can Be A Bayesian After All

Clark Glymour’s “Why I Am Not A Bayesian” has been one of the most influential papers in the philosophy of statistics. Since its initial publication in 1984, it has been reprinted in at least xxx popular anthologies (cite). People really care why Clark Glymour is not a Bayesian.

Using Glymour’s own points, I show that Glymour could have been a Bayesian all along. His arguments are excellent, but they miss their target. I show that all [except x?] of the problems which he identifies with Bayesianism had already been anticipated, and solved, by 1984. Not surprisingly, since “solved” is a success word, they remain solved to this day.

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According to Bill Jefferys, Roger Rosencrantz deals with one of Glymour’s main points in his paper “Why Glymour Is A Bayesian”.