Bas Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image. 1980

I don’t have too many notes on this. I will look to put a few down soon while they are fresh in my mind. I seem to roughly agree - I need to follow up some of the more sophisticated counterarguments to formulate a clearer conception of where the positions (constructive empiricism versus realism) differ in pragmatic terms (which obviously begs the question a little to start with).

A few points after discussion with Mark: - Interesting question of whether there are any ‘real life’ implications of this debate for science. Mark’s examples of metaphysical debates bringing practical dilemmas in maths and use of logic in fiction (which seems particularly relevant considering Van Fraassen’s contextual view of explanation). Are there any good examples in this context?

- There is also an interesting question regarding how Van Fraassen deals with the reference class problem in probability/statistics. It appears (to me) that he accepts it as a consequence of the contextual aspect of description and explanation in science. This does not dissolve the reference class problem but rather seems to accept it as a necessary consequence of any scientific activity.