Tom Swann Colyvan Naturalizing Normativity

Colyvan - Naturalising Normativity >>>is this from the new DBM edited collection? my print out isn’t titled<<<

##1 Introduction

p1 “When we describe some set of beliefs or actions as rational, we mean that these beliefs or actions are sanctioned by the relevant (normative) theories (Bayesian belief theory and decision theory, respectively). We might add logic, the study of rational inferences, to the mix.”

surely these are at best formalisations of what we mean when…!<<<

these theories purport to be about idealised agents, not actual agents.

but where do they get their normative force?

‘ought’ is an odd operator. can’t get it from matters of fact.

secures the normativity by naturalism. fallibilism. against Jackson style.

##2 From the Non-modal to the Modal

no necessity from actuality, but we can get possibility. but we can describe a range of possible worlds to get necessity wrt them

but does this just cheat?

doesn’t matter. “content to demonstrate that various normative claims concerning rationality can be derived from matters of fact.”

we too often think that modal claims are of a quite different kind to non-modal claims. thinks this is mistaken

showing that conditions for use of one vocabulary can be specified in another don’t show that they’re the same!<<<

##3 From the Descriptive to the Prescriptive

most reasoners reason like so but a gap

good reasoners reason like so now it is circular

can we give an independent account of a good reasoner? good chess player makes good chess moves. but we can spell out making good chess players in terms of winning games of chess.

teleological account. good reasoner better adapted to certain goals survival? but not all bad reasoners have been selected against.

someone whose reasoning is well supported by our best theories of reasoning. not circular. we find that they are the best not by way of looking to best reasoners.

Theories of rationality must employ a great deal of what they set out to explain and systematize. But this is ok.

invoking a certain respect for scientific theories. naturalism but this is a normative claim. rational to believe only our best theories.

#4 The role of Naturalism

not just taking up an attitude not arguing for naturalism from basic principles arguing from the fruits of the labour

understanding science very broadly our best scientific theories are just our best theories.

self-evident, but not trivial

but it’s the question of what should count as ‘best’ that is at issue!<<<

Katz 2000 claims naturalism leads to paradox. Colyvan 2005 argues this is wrong. “Naturalism and the Paradox of Revisability” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

“The account of normativity I’ve been defending depends on naturalism’s respect for the (current) best scientific theories of rationality. It is thus a defeasible account and typically canons of rationality will change depending on the state of science at the time.”

not quite. on this view naturalism is an account providing a defeasible commitment, rather than a defeasible account of our commitments.<<<

The Ramsey-Lewis Approach to Normativity

contrast with Canberra plan

Nola 2003 - all we need to do is seperate the normative terms out of from the non-normative, do the Ramsey-Lewis thing on them “The resulting implicit definition of the normative terms in question appeals only to their functional role in the theory and this is articulated only in non-normative vocabulary.”

Formalisation of what Colyvan urged earlier?

“The Ramsey-Lewis approach’s response is to eliminate the normative in favour of the non-normative. The approach I’m suggesting reduces all normativity to just one—the normativity implicit in naturalism.”

this is like saying that the only reasoning that we should try to attain is that which meets our standards of best reasoning. tells us nothing we didn’t already know.

<<<

Both are concerned with dealing with the Humean thing.

Rational choice theory is normative spelled out in non-normative terms - maximise expected utility.

is utility really not a normative notion?<<<

in the Nola version of the Canberra planning, the normative-descriptive gap bridged by definitions. in Colyvan’s version there is no definition

except the definitions laid down in the sciences?<<<

The Ramsey-Lewis approach defines terms via their functional role in relevant theories. (folk or scientific) Colyvan’s approach: “You ought to do what your best theory says to do. Why? because you ought to believe your best scientific theories. And the threatening regress is blocked by invoking the doctrine of naturalism. In effect, on this approach, all normativity arises from the normativity built into the doctrine of naturalism.”

They seem to me to be doing different things. The Ramsey-Lewis approach is looking for what makes true what we say. This approach looks for what we should say. Major difference is that the R-L approach is looking for something like truth-makers, whereas Colyvan is much more Quinean. But this might be an extraneous difference with respect to how they treat normativity per se. <<<

The R-L approach is also naturalistic. But here the normative terms are defined via naturalistically respectable terms. But naturalism itself does no real work in the account.

Colyvan’s account can only apply to scientific theories of rationality. Canberra plan works for folk theories. (but only once they’ve been cleaned up, etc)

sense in which they’re different games.