Tom Swann Attempts To Form A Question
##Possible Chapter Topics
X ’ Sellars on the Scientific and Manifest Images of Man
life-world and world-picture? ~ phenomenology
different ways of relating the two - elimination of manifest (at best, convenient fiction.) - elimination of scientific (at best, convenient fiction.) - fitting the manifest over or inside the scientific - compromise between the two - or Sellar’s stereoscopic image (not clear what difference these last two)
elimination about justification is not an option. so if justification is in the manifest but not in the scientific, big problem.
X - Naturalised Epistemology - Quine’s infamous declaration - Is Quine fixing Hume? - Quine v.s. the other naturalisers - can we rely on reliablism?.
X ’ Naturalistic study of the objects of epistemology
X ’ Normative Supervenience - easy to say, hard to explain. - supervenience itself explains nothing
X ’ Turning Linguistic - Talk-talk ontological commitments, different disjoint worlds, adjudicating and even talking about frameworks
X ’ Intentionally Touching the World - Mc Dowell style stuff. - why a rational relation to the world needed for content at all?
The problem of placing various types of normativity in a naturalistic world picture
(taking into account the way that science is manifest to us).
~I didn’t write that? Yes I did?~
Crucial to do these things
narrow down what I mean by >types of normativity >> think I’ll focus on epistemic justification. Provides neat circles of presuppositionality. >naturalistic >> paradigm cases: >>>ontological physicalism. try to avoid argybargy about technical details. at the least: the possibilities of the physical determine all of possibility space. So cannot avoid problem of what “physical” means: trees and rocks physical or completed physics physical, relation between? Stronger is to claim entailment from future physics physicals to much else - what else? Grounding entails entailment?
Find some patches of the literature to get cosy with. > Price on subject naturalism > Mc Dowellian stuff groping towards reasons as causes > Naturalised Epistemology